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Abstract The difference between permanent legislation and temporary legislation
is the default rule of termination: permanent legislation governs perpetually, while
temporary legislation governs for a limited time. Recent literature on legislative
timing rules considers the effect of temporary legislation to stop at the moment of
expiration. When the law expires, so does its regulatory effect. This article extends
that literature by examining the effect of temporary legislation beyond its expira-
tion. We show that in addition to affecting compliance behavior which depends on
statutory enforcement, temporary legislation also affects compliance behavior
which does not depend on statutory enforcement, and more generally, organiza-
tional behavior after a sunset. When temporary legislation expires therefore, it can
continue to administer regulatory and other effects. We specify the conditions for
this process and give the optimal legislative response.
Keywords Timing rules  Temporary legislation  Sunset clauses  Statutory
obsolescence
JEL Classification K23  K42
1 Introduction
Legislatures can pass legislation temporarily by including a duration or ‘‘sunset’’
clause that automatically invalidates a statute on a specified date. These clauses
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allow the legislature to authorize a statute for a limited time and govern temporarily.
In contrast to ‘‘normal’’ permanent legislation, temporary legislation does not
require additional legislative action for its rescission. It loses any legally binding
effect when it reaches its predetermined date of expiration and can only be extended
if the legislature passes a new bill that specifies an additional period of legal
validity. Recent literature on legislative timing rules treats the effect of temporary
legislation as dependent upon the continued existence of a legally binding rule
(Parisi et al. 2004; Gersen 2007; Gersen and Posner 2007; Luppi and Parisi 2009;
Yin 2009). The discussion assumes that when legislation expires, any compliance
effect associated with that legislation also expires. No explicit consideration is given
to the possibility that legislation can produce effects independent of statutory
enforcement. For example, temporary law can be expressive, and change the level
of social sanctioning around the substance of a law (Cooter 1998; McAdams and
Rasmusen 2005; Funk 2007; Feldman 2009). Temporary tariffs and industry
regulations can lead to the permanent destruction of an industry or the emergence of
substitute products (Nye 2007). Lobbies and coalitions can form around temporary
policies, and can remain in place to seek other opportunities after a temporary policy
expires (Rasmusen 1993; Grossman and Helpman 2001). Temporary polices that
inform or create focal points can permanently change modes of coordination
(Dharmapala and McAdams 2003). Generally, policies that change prevailing
behavior can leave residual effects, even after those policies have expired.
This article extends the research on timing rules by examining the interrelation
between the choice of temporary timing rule and its post-expiration effect. When
temporary laws leave residual effects, the benefits of lawmaking that the literature
has confined to the period of statutory enforcement can spill over into future
periods, where statutory enforcement is no longer in place. If legislators can
anticipate such a spillover, then they may choose a temporary timing rule instead of
a permanent timing rule to save costs. Our model explicitly deals with their
anticipation, and how they can save those costs.
2 The model
The model describes a unit measure of agents, with heterogeneous preferences
independently drawn from an absolutely continuous distribution. Legislators
minimize costs based upon their anticipation of the post-expiration effect of
legislation.1 We refer to the post-expiration effect generally as compliance for
exposition.2
1 Thus the model follows the existing literature on timing rules by examining the behavior of a majority
group of legislators with heterogeneous preferences. Posner and Vermeule (2008) give several recent
scenarios from the 107 and 110th Congresses. For a different approach, where timing rules are the
outcome of gridlock within the legislature, see Auerbach (2006).
2 Our use of compliance underscores that temporary lawmaking goals can continue to be realized after
sunset. However, any post-expiration behavioral or organizational change may be supposed without
affecting our results.
Eur J Law Econ
123
The model has a two period time-line. At the beginning of the game, the true
state of the world is unknown, i.e. the actual effectiveness of the chosen policy in
producing compliance is unknown. In period 1, the legislators move first to choose
s [ {0,1}, the binary decision between a temporary timing rule (0) and a permanent
timing rule (1). Agents then set their intra- and interagent relations and choose their
compliance levels. In period 2, legislators decide either to reauthorize the temporary
legislation or let it expire, or to repeal the permanent legislation or let it continue. In
our formal model, period 2 is notional. Its significance is that at the beginning of the
period, legislators can observe a signal related to the true state, i.e. they become
better aware of the effectiveness of the policy in producing compliance. The
precision of that signal is assumed to be increasing in the level of compliance
chosen by the agents in period 1.3
Contingent on the assumption that signal precision is increasing in the level of
compliance, it is reasonable to assume that a more precise signal will lead to a better
decision. Hence the underlying premise of the model is that the value of a period 2
decision by legislators is increasing, for both the legislators and the agents, in the
period 1 level of compliance by agents. We capture this aspect by introducing a
‘‘value of revealed information’’ term in the objective functions of the players. By
backward induction, in any equilibrium, legislators will take into account the
agents’ best response and choose s accordingly in period 1. The order of play can be
summarized as:
(1) Legislators choose the timing rule, s, from set {0,1}, where (0) is a temporary
timing rule and (1) is a permanent timing rule.
(2) Agents are matched within period 1 to play a game where they set their intra-
and interagent relations.
(3) At the end of that period, agents choose their compliance levels.
(4) Legislators observe the aggregate compliance level and decide either to
reauthorize the temporary legislation or let it expire, or to repeal the permanent
legislation or let it continue.
In the following section, we demonstrate how agents set their relations when
legislators impose new legislation. The state of agent relations that prevails
determines how agents choose their optimal compliance level, shown in Sect. 2.2.
Lastly in Sect. 2.3, we show that by backward induction, legislators will take into
account the agents’ best response compliance level and choose to legislate
temporarily or permanently.
2.1 Agent relations
Before agents choose their compliance levels, agents first set their intra- and
interagent relations in response to new legislation which yields population state c.
3 This assumption rests on the reasoning that the higher the compliance level, the more visible is the
policy outcome.
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The introduction of c allows us to account for how the prevailing state of behavior
throughout the population affects an individual agent’s choice of compliance. Thus,
any payoff from compliance is dependent upon not only contemporary statutory
enforcement, but upon any previous change in cost structure from past statutory
enforcement in addition.
For example, a person may experience a change in their intrapersonal relations
when the legislature passes a new law. One who has internalized an obedience to
law norm permits the new law to change the magnitudes of their guilt cost for
noncompliance or of their pride benefit from compliance. The fact that the behavior
is now legally sanctioned produces new magnitudes. There can be preexisting levels
of guilt and pride for the behavior embodied in the law, but upon being codified,
those levels are increased if legislation is expressive. If the legislation is not
expressive, then those levels remain unaffected (Cooter 2000). Similarly, a person
can permit a new law to update their interpersonal relations which govern their
willingness to disapprove or approve of another person’s noncompliance or
compliance. The fact that the behavior is now codified makes a person more willing
to sanction others if the legislation is expressive. If it is not, their willingness
remains at preexisting levels (Cooter 1998). While statutory enforcement may
impact the cost of compliance, the law may additionally affect a change in the cost
of compliance through its impact upon the constellation of intra- and interagent
relations. A change in normative relations changes the cost structure of compliance,
and the expiration of a temporary policy does not necessarily return those normative
relations to their pre-policy levels.
In the case of temporary policies that inform, agent relations are updated when a
person becomes aware of a new policy either through direct communication from
lawmakers, or through interagent learning. Once the temporary policy expires,
agents may retain coordinative information that continues to affect their choice of
compliance. Or in the case of temporary tariffs or regulations, firms update their
behavior when they expect the benefits of adapting to a temporary policy to
outweigh the costs waiting for the policy to potentially expire. Also here, an update
in behavior can continue to administer a regulatory effect after the sunset. For
example, the firm may have incurred costs that restrain entry or exit through the
adoption of a new production process or through other adaptations to the temporary
legal environment. If the firm does not incur those costs and chooses to wait for the
temporary policy to expire instead, we understand that no update has taken place.
In the case of resource allocation toward creating policies, the lobbies and
coalitions that are updated or formed to create temporary policies may continue to
seek other legislative or regulatory opportunities once a temporary policy has
expired. If an existing lobby or coalition creates the new policy, or if the new lobby
or coalition has no effect beyond the temporary policy, again we understand that no
update has taken place. Generally, after the legislature passes a law the agent
chooses m [ {U, -U}, where (U) denotes the decision to update some composite
measure of their intra- and interagent relations and (–U) denotes the decision to not
update.
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2.1.1 Strategic agent relations
The agent relations game below maps the interaction between two agents after the
legislature has passed a new law, and after each agent has chosen to update or not
update. Each of the players has private knowledge regarding whether or not the new
law has been caused an internal update. That knowledge is revealed when player 1
complies or does not comply with the behavior embodied in the new law when in
the presence of the other agent. If she complies, player 1 reveals that she has
updated her agent relations, always intrapersonally since she moves first in time
with no knowledge of player 2’s potential sanction by construction. Upon observing
player 1’s behavior, player 2 chooses to sanction or to not sanction player 1. If
player 2 sanctions player 1, player 2 reveals that she has updated her interagent
relations. Otherwise, she reveals that no interagent update has taken place.4
We examine the case where ((a - c)(d - b)) \ 0 and the game has a single
dominant strategy equilibrium, and where (a [ c, d [ b)) and the game presents a
problem of coordination. An aspiration an imitation model is used to examine
repeated play.5
2.1.2 Dynamic agent relations
When player 1 is not sanctioned or player 2 observes noncompliance, they learn that
one other agent has not permitted the new law to change their behavior. On the other
hand, when player 1 is sanctioned or player 2 observes compliance, they learn that
one other agent has permitted the new law to change their behavior. What they learn
gives their actual payoff, ranging from the value of incurring no costs or receiving
no benefits to the value of incurring some costs or receiving some benefits. Costs
might reflect industry sanctioning from following or not following a temporary
policy, especially when concerted action may lead to a temporary extension or
expiration of a regulation (Coglianese et al. 2004). Benefits might reflect increased
profits and enhanced government relations. In other contexts, costs may take the
form of sanctioning from competitor lobbies or lost coalition opportunities, and
benefits may take the form of rents extracted from legislative and regulatory
opportunities. In the case of a temporary policy that is expressive, the costs of
noncompliance may be understood as internal guilt and external disapproval
from fellow citizens. The benefits of compliance may be understood as pride
and approval.
Generally, the payoff from updating or not updating is interdependent. This actual
payoff that agents learn from interacting with other agents is then compared to an
4 For knowledge to be revealed to both players, it is necessary that the players interact. What the players
observe or do not observe in each other reveals information. Zasu (2008) constructs a model that shows
that higher levels of interaction, or connectivity within groups, can result in higher levels of sanctioning.
5 Aspiration and imitation models are based upon processes where agents compare their actual payoff to
an aspired payoff, and as a result of that comparison, sometimes choose a different strategy by imitating
others. They are often employed for modeling the emergence of social norms. See Binmore and
Samuelson (1997), Samuelson (1997), Benaim and Weibull (2003), Traulsen et al. (2005).
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aspired level of what the agent thinks is appropriate.6 If the actual payoff deviates
from an aspired payoff, players may be motivated to choose to update or to not update
by imitating their previous opponent in the next iteration of the game. For this reason,
we are particularly interested in examining the cases where the levels of A, B, C
and D result in each coordination profile (U, U) and (-U, -U) as Nash equilibria.7
Consider the symmetric 2 9 2 game given in Fig. 1 where there is a single finite
population of N agents. Let time be discretely divided into intervals of length t.
During each iteration, an agent is characterized by their pure strategy (U) or (-U)
that she implements in that iteration. During each iteration of length t, pairs of
agents are randomly drawn to play one game. They are drawn independently and
without replacement, and the various ways that they can be matched are equally
probable. Their payoffs A, B, C and D are expected. Actual realized payoffs are
random, given by the expected payoff of A, B, C or D plus the outcome R of a
random variable ~R. This variable has an expected value of 0. It is included to capture
any random shock that disturbs the player’s payoffs, and is intended to highlight any
complication that the players may encounter in identifying their payoffs precisely,
apart from simply choosing between (U) and (-U).8
Fig. 1 A stylized model of agent relations
6 The aspired level can be based upon their prior levels of guilt, pride, disapproval, and approval before
interacting. Other likely bases for aspiration levels include higher-order expectations such as what an
agent thinks some outside authority thinks the payoff should be (Lewis 1969). For our results to hold, it is
sufficient to assume that only some type of comparison is taking place.
7 In the context of new expressive laws or industry regulations particularly, it may be that the strategy
distribution is relatively unknown until a sufficient level of interaction has taken place. What one learns
from interaction, namely the other person’s strategy to update or to not update, can serve as a metric for
the general level of receptivity to the new law throughout the community. Moreover, since coordination
around updating or not updating leads to higher levels of guilt, pride, disapproval, and approval, imitation
profiles (U, U) and (-U, -U) are likely to emerge.
8 While Fudenberg and Harris (1992) build a model where is correlated across agents, that is, where
environmental factors impose a common risk to all agents, we treat the distribution of ~R as independently
and identically distributed. In this case its distribution does not depend on the selection of strategy.
Eur J Law Econ
123
When an agent plays update and meets another agent who plays update, her
expected payoff is A and her realized payoff is A ? R. If she updates her agent
relations in a population where a proportion k is also updating, then her expected
payoff is given by
pUðkÞ ¼ kA þ ð1  kÞC ð1Þ
where her expectation is taken with respect to both the likely identity of her
opponent and the likely realization of ~R. If she chooses to not update in a population
where a proportion k is updating, then her expected payoff pUðkÞ is given by
pUðkÞ ¼ kB þ ð1  kÞD ð2Þ
During each iteration t, each person draws from an independently distributed
Bernoulli random variable. Let the time units of measure be chosen so that with
probability t, the distribution yields the outcome learn. With the probability 1 - t,
the distribution yields the outcome not learn. A person who receives a learn draw
remembers her realized payoff of the previous iteration and evaluates it as
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If her realized payoff exceeds her aspiration level,
then she evaluates her strategy as satisfactory and maintains that strategy in the
following iteration of the game. If her realized payoff does not exceed her aspiration
level, she loses confidence in her current strategy and abandons it. When for
example, a person plays update in a population in which everyone plays update, and
then receives a learn draw, the corresponding probability that she abandons the
update strategy is
gðAÞ ¼ probðA þ R\DÞ ¼ FðD  AÞ ð3Þ
where D is her aspiration level, R is the realization of random payoff variable ~R, and
F is the cumulative distribution of ~R. Similar expressions can be given for payoffs B,
C and D.
Following Samuelson (1997), we assume F is uniform along the interval [-x,
x], where payoffs {A, B, C, D} , [D - x, D ? x].9 The Uniform distribution’s
linearity permits the passing of a player’s expectations through function g given by
Eq. 3. Hence, when a person plays update and a proportion of the population
playing update is k, then the probability that she abandons update is given by
gðpUðkÞÞ ¼ FðD  pUðkÞÞ: ð4Þ
If agent i evaluates her payoff as unsatisfactory and abandons it in the next
iteration of the game, she must now choose a strategy. We assume that she randomly
selects another member j from the population. With probability 1 - k, she imitates j
’s strategy.10 With probability k, agent i chooses to not imitate j. In this case, she is a
‘‘mutant’’ or ‘‘asocial’’, and chooses to play the opposite strategy of j.
9 The Uniform distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, which is necessary and
sufficient for it to be more likely that low average expected payoffs produce low average realized payoffs.
This condition allows realized payoffs to provide a useful basis for strategy evaluation.
10 It is possible that she may play the same strategy that she played in the game’s first iteration, after
receiving confirmation from j that update or not update may in fact be the best reply.
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Within this framework, various relational outcomes can be imagined. For
example, upon learning of a new law, a person may not have developed a new
source of guilt for noncompliant behavior. Thus she does not experience a
normative update. Suppose she comes into contact with another person who has
experienced a normative update. She approaches the interaction with an aspiration
payoff in mind, justified in part by her own level of guilt (in this case it can be 0). If
her payoff is unsatisfactory because, for example, the other person disapproved of
her noncompliance and made her feel guilt, she may abandon her strategy to not
update her normative relations. Given a learn draw, she may instead choose to
imitate j (i.e. update her normative relations) with probability 1 - k, leading to
compliance or noncompliance independent of her initial reaction to an expressive
law.
2.1.3 Infinite population
Let c^ be a replicator of the form
c^ ¼ cðpuðcÞ þ kð1  2cÞðK  pÞÞ ð5Þ
where c [ [0,1] is the fraction of an infinite population playing update, p ¼
cpuðcÞ þ ð1  cÞpUðcÞ is the expected payoff, K is a constant which does not
depend on the prevailing state of agent relations, and where
pUðcÞ ¼ cA þ ð1  cÞC ð6Þ
pUðcÞ ¼ cB þ ð1  cÞD: ð7Þ
These two equations are similar to Eqs. 1–2 in that they replace k with c. pU(c)
gives the expected payoff to an agent playing update when the proportion c of her
opponents play update. If a finite population were at state c, meaning that proportion
c of the population were playing update, then a person playing update faces a
population that also plays update in a slightly smaller proportion c. As the
population reaches infinity, this distinction disappears and c becomes both the
proportion playing update and the current state of agent relations.
For a population of size N and a time period length t, the aspiration and imitation
model is a Markov process with N ? 1 population states u [ {0, v, 2v,…,1}, where
v = 1/N and uN is the number of agents playing update in state u. By examining the
double limit as N gets large and t gets small, we allow the aspiration and imitation
model to be governed by the replicator given in Eq. 5. Now, instead of state u(t)
describing the number of agents playing update at moment t defined on discrete
points {0, t, 2t,…,}, state c(t) describes a deterministic solution to the differential
equation c, which takes on values in [0,1]. This permits the probabilities from
moving one step to the right or left to be calculated for a given state u, which in turn,
can be used to construct an approximation of the behavior of the agent relations
game over time.11
11 By focusing on short time periods, the probability that two persons receive the learn draw, potentially
moving u by more than one step, is negligible.
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Suppose c(t) is governed by the replicator given in Eq. 5 with the boundary
condition that c(0) = u(0). When U is a coordination game such that (a [ c, d [ b),
there are three Nash equilibria, two in pure strategies given by (U, U) and (-U,
-U), and one in mixed strategies. Three stationary states #, i, and j exist, satisfying
0\#\i\j\1 (Samuelson 1997, Proposition 3.1). The inner stationary state i is
unstable, but # and j are asymptotically stable with attraction basins ½0; iÞ and ði; 1.
As k ? 0, each of the stationary states converge to the three Nash equilibria of U
(Fig. 2). Stationary state # converges to the equilibrium where all agents play (U).
Stationary state j converges to the equilibrium where all agents play (-U).
Stationary state i converges to the mixed equilibrium.
Suppose the legislator observes a stationary state of agent relations c(0) = u(0)
within the basin ½0; iÞ. The replicator will move close to # where the agents are
playing the profile (U, U), and remain in its vicinity forever. Similarly, when the
legislator observes state c(0) = u(0) within the basin ði; 1, the replicator will move
close to k where the agents are playing the profile (-U, -U), and remain in its
vicinity forever.
When payoffs are such that strategies (U) or (-U) dominate, we will see that
lawmakers can more easily evaluate period 2 legislation costs. On the other hand,
we would have to impose very strong informational assumptions for players to be
able to clearly identify dominant strategies in the agent relations game that is
procedurally time consistent. Agents are likely to remain ignorant of the strategy
distribution throughout the population until some level of interaction with other
agents occurs. Moreover, when agent relations are characterized by coordination, it
is likely that no strategy yet dominates and multiple equilibria still exist. Although
period 2 legislation costs are more ambiguous in this scenario, legislators may still
be able to optimize on timing rule selection. If legislators observe a stationary state
within either coordination basin, the replicator dynamics will move close to # or j
and remain in either vicinity forever. We only need to suppose that players reject
strategies that yield payoffs that fall short of an aspired level, and instead imitate.
2.2 Agent’s optimal compliance
Once agents set their relations, they choose their optimal compliance level for the
new legislation. An individual agent’s utility function is given by
uiðlci; ai; sÞ ¼ ðlci; aiÞ2  pcðx  aiÞ2  ccsðaiÞ2 þ bWðaiÞ ð8Þ
where lci is the ideal policy position for the individual i and x is the policy location
of the proposed legislation. Both lie anywhere on the real line. Each agent chooses
an action, ai, which again lies on the real line. The distance x  aij j is the measure of
Fig. 2 Phase diagram for the agent relations game with replicator dynamics
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a person’s lack of compliance, which has a proportional penalty attached, due to
sanctioning from first-, second-, and third-party enforcement. The magnitude of the
penalty is dependent upon the prevailing state of agent relations c, i.e. the portion of
the population playing update. On the other hand, compliance itself is costly since it
requires adjustment away from the status quo. These costs, denoted here by the
function ccs() are dependent upon the state of agent relations c, the length of the
legislation s, and the difference between the policy location of the original
legislation, i.e. the status quo that is normalized to be 0, and the chosen action ai.
W, since realized in the second period, is discounted by the factor b, which
represents the impatience of the populace. In our two-period formulation of the
game, the adjustment cost is incurred by the agents in the first period only. We do
not model any strategic interaction in the second period explicitly. Instead, we make
the simplifying assumption that the socially optimal decision will be made in period
2 given the information revealed in period 1. By introducing a term that captures the
value generated by revealed information in the form of the socially optimal decision
and including it in the objective functions of the agents, we abstract away from
modeling future periods repeatedly.
Rewriting the function above with d = x-ai, which is the distance between the
new legislation and the actual action chosen by an agent, and, which can be
interpreted as the level of disobedience, we get
uiðlci; di; sÞ ¼ ðlci;x þ diÞ2  pcðdiÞ2  ccsðx  diÞ2 þ bWðx  diÞ ð9Þ
Let ccs be a quadratic cost function, consisting of both fixed and marginal costs of
moving away from the status quo
ccsðaiÞ ¼ acs þ bcsa2i ¼ acs þ bcsðx  diÞ2 ð10Þ
We substitute in Eq. 10 and get
ðlci;x þ diÞ2  pcðdiÞ2  acs  bcsðx  diÞ2  bWðx  diÞ ð11Þ
Maximizing gives an individual optimal level of di
di ¼
x  lci
1 þ pc þ bcs þ
bcsx
1 þ pc þ bcs 
1
2ð1 þ pc þ bcsÞbWa ð12Þ
where Wa is the partial derivative of W with respect to a.
Now, looking at the expression for optimal disobedience chosen, we can clearly
see the various forces at play. First and foremost, as expected, disobedience is
higher, the further away the new policy is from the agent’s preferred position. But
the penalty pc, exerts a downward pressure on this response. More importantly, the
second term in the expression suggests, disobedience is higher the more radical the
policy is, i.e. the further away it is from the status quo. But again, the effects are
dampened by the penalty imposed. The marginal cost of obedience, bcs has a
significant influence on it as well. Particularly, as
o
obcs
bcs
1 þ pc þ bcs
 
[ 0 ð13Þ
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disobedience is higher if the marginal cost of compliance is higher. The last term
indicates that, the higher the marginal value of information revealed by first period
obedience, the lower will be disobedience.
The location of the state of agent relations c affects the agent’s disobedience in
three ways. First, updates in intra- and interagent relations increase the amount of
guilt and disapproval or other sanctioning for disobedience. Penalty pc then,
increases as the replicator moves toward # where agents are playing the profile (U,
U). Second, updates in intra- and interagent relations increase the amount of pride
and approval or other benefits for obedience. The cost of compliance ccs decreases
as the replicator moves toward #. Lastly, updates shift the ideal policy position
toward new legislation. That is, the distance x  lc
  decreases as c approaches #.
Otherwise, if c is in the vicinity of j and no updating prevails, existing levels of
intra- and interagent relations remain unchanged, and pc, bcs and x  lc
  remain
unchanged.
Integrating over the whole distribution of individual choices gives the aggregate
d for any given distribution, among agents, of ideal policy positions l. For any
given distribution of l, say f(l), the aggregate level of noncompliance is given by
d ¼
Z
dif ðlÞdl: ð14Þ
Note that since integration is a linear operation, the various parameters effect d
the same way as discussed above for individual di.
2.3 Legislature’s optimal timing rule
Given the agents’ anticipated aggregate disobedience level d, the legislators respond
by minimizing transaction costs, i.e. maximizing the objective function.
vðs; dÞ ¼ /sjxj  dwsjdj þ dVðx  dÞ ð15Þ
The first term indicates the enactment cost of the proposed legislation which is
directly proportional to the absolute distance from the status quo. The second term,
discounted at rate d 2 ð0; 1Þ, is the future extension or repeal costs, which we
generally refer to as legislative maintenance costs. Let ws be a quadratic cost
function, consisting of both fixed and marginal costs of maintaining legislation with
respect to the aggregate compliance level.
wsjdj ¼ ys þ qs þ ðzs  rsÞd2 ð16Þ
The fixed portion represents transaction costs that are independent of compliance
and include such costs as adhering to rules that stipulate legislative voting
procedures or presentment of the legislation before the executive. These costs are
constitutionally fixed and increase linearly in the number of times that the
legislation is extended or repealed. Each fixed cost extension or repeal is normalized
to be 1. Since permanent legislation cannot be extended, fixed extension costs
y1 = 0 by definition. On the other hand, temporary legislation can either expire or
be extended one or more times, and y0  0. Both temporary and permanent
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legislation may be repealed, therefore fixed repeal costs qs  1.12 The marginal
portion of ws represents those costs dependent upon the aggregate compliance level
attained in period 1, where zs denotes extension costs and rs denotes repeal costs.
Because permanent legislation cannot be extended, z1 = 0 by definition. Lastly, the
third term of Eq. 16 represents the value of revealed information in making an
optimal decision in period 2. This again is a function of aggregate compliance d.
We want to focus on the choice between temporary or permanent legislation for
any given new policy x. The legislature chooses the optimal s, from the two possible
values 0 or 1. We denote 0 as the decision to legislate temporarily, and 1 as the
decision to legislate permanently. Hence, the legislators will choose to legislate
temporarily if
/0jxj  dw0jdj þ dVðx  dÞ[  /1jxj  dw1jdj þ dVðx  dÞ ð17Þ
Substitute in Eq. 10 and get
 /0jxj  dðy0 þ q0 þ ðz0  r0Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ[
 /1jxj  dðy1 þ q1 þ ðz1  r1Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ
ð18Þ
3 Comparing welfare
As mentioned above, the location of agent relations c in Markov state space affect
the penalty, the marginal cost of compliance, and the location of the ideal policy
position. Each of these affect aggregate compliance. For example, when c
approaches the update profile basin #, the penalty is increased, the marginal cost
of compliance is decreased, and the ideal policy position moves toward the loca-
tion of the new legislation. Compliance is therefore increased, and thus the overall
value of information revealed regarding the optimal location of the legislation is
increased. This plays a significant role in the legislature’s strategic choice. The
legislature induces higher levels of compliance by passing new legislation that
updates agent relations, but is only able to realize that value under a temporary
timing rule. At the same time, new legislation may fail to update agent relations and
may require high fixed extension costs. We begin by characterizing the optimal
timing rule when legislation fails to update agent relations.
Proposition 1. If the profile (-U, -U) of the agent relations game obtains in
dominant strategies, social welfare is maximized with permanent timing rules when
the difference in permanent and temporary enactment costs are less than any
potential savings of permanent maintenance costs, i.e. ð/1  /0Þjxj\dy0. Social
welfare is maximized with temporary timing rules when ð/1  /0Þjxj[ dy0, and
either timing rule maximizes social welfare when ð/1  /0Þjxj ¼ dy0.13
When (-U, -U) obtains in dominant strategies, the location of agent relations c
is j. Agent relations within the population do not undergo updating, and existing
12 Legislation cannot be repealed twice. If the same legislation is reenacted and repealed at some point in
the future, it is understood as new legislation.
13 All proofs are given in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Eur J Law Econ
123
levels of guilt, pride, disapproval, approval and other costs and benefits dependent
upon agent relations prevail, irrespective of new legislation. Therefore, penalty pc
and the marginal cost of compliance bcs remain unchanged. The location of the ideal
policy position lc, remains unchanged as well. It follows that agent utility and
aggregate compliance levels remain unaffected by new legislation, and that
marginal maintenance costs (zc - rc) remain at existing levels for both temporary
and permanent legislation. However, the fixed portion of maintenance costs can
differ. When temporary legislation is extended at least once, y0 [ 0, and fixed
maintenance costs for temporary timing rules are strictly greater than fixed
maintenance of permanent timing rules. Legislators therefore, are faced with the
choice between any additional costs of enacting legislation permanently instead of
temporarily, and any potential cost savings of permanent maintenance. When the
difference in enactment costs is less than any fixed temporary extension costs, social
welfare is maximized with a permanent timing rule.
Corollary 2. If U is a coordination game with payoffs (a [ c, d [ b) and the
stationary state of agent relations c is within the basin ði; 1, social welfare is
maximized with permanent timing rules as k ? 0 and when ð/1  /0Þjxj\dy0.
Social welfare is maximized with temporary timing rules as k ? 0 and when
ð/1  /0Þjxj[ dy0, and either timing rule maximizes social welfare as k ? 0 and
ð/1  /0Þjxj ¼ dy0.
Proposition 3. If the profile (U, U) obtains in dominant strategies, social welfare is
maximized with temporary timing rules when any savings in marginal maintenance
costs plus the difference in permanent and temporary enactment costs are greater than
temporary fixed maintenance costs, i.e. dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þjxj\dy0. Social welfare
is maximized with permanent timing rules when dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þjxj[ dy0, and
either timing rule maximizes social welfare when dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þjxj ¼ dy0.
When (U, U) obtains in dominant strategies, the location of agent relations c is #.
Agent relations in the population undergo updating, and the existing levels of guilt,
pride, disapproval, approval and other costs and benefits dependent upon agent
relations increase. Therefore, penalty pc, which exerts a downward pressure on
optimal disobedience, increases; the marginal cost of compliance bcs, which exerts an
upward pressure on optimal disobedience, decreases. The distribution of ideal policy
positions lc, also in response to updating, shifts toward the location of new legislation.
This shift decreases the absolute distance x - lc, which dampens disobedience. It
follows that agent utility and aggregate compliance levels increase, and unlike the
scenario where no updating takes place, marginal maintenance costs are affected.
Now marginal maintenance costs are affected for both permanent and temporary
timing rules, but permanent legislation can not be extended. This means that
permanent legislation only realizes any effect from an increase in aggregate
compliance for repeals, while temporary legislation realizes any effect for
extensions and repeals. Particularly, an increase in compliance increases marginal
repeal costs rs, but decreases marginal extension costs z0. Therefore, temporary
marginal maintenance costs are strictly less than permanent marginal maintenance
costs when aggregate compliance d increases. However, since a temporary timing
rule can require multiple extensions, fixed temporary maintenance costs are weakly
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greater than fixed permanent maintenance costs. As a result, social welfare is
maximized with temporary timing rules when any savings in marginal maintenance
costs plus any savings in temporary enactment costs are greater than any additional
fixed extension costs. Otherwise, if numerous extensions are sufficiently costly,
social welfare is maximized when legislators forgo the savings of that portion of
extensions costs which are dependent upon d and legislate once and for all with a
permanent timing rule.
Corollary 4. If U is a coordination game with payoffs (a [ c, d [ b) and the
stationary state of agent relations c is within the basin ½0; iÞ, social welfare is
maximized with temporary timing rules as k ? 0 and when dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þ
jxj\dy0. Social welfare is maximized with permanent timing rules as k ? 0 and
when dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þjxj[ dy0, and either timing rule maximizes social
welfare as k ? 0 and when dz0 d2 þ ð/1  /0Þjxj ¼ dy0.
4 Discussion
The preceding analysis demonstrates how agent relations influence a population’s
choice of compliance, and how the consequence of that choice affects the
legislature’s strategic decision to legislate temporarily or permanently. The analysis
highlights an important dimension of the timing rule decision that has been
unaddressed in the literature, namely the residual effects of a temporary policy.
Legislation can update agent relations and increase compliance levels after the law
has expired. It may be rare that temporary legislation so decisively moves a
population to an update or no update equilibrium. For this reason, we show that the
results still hold when the agents are in a basin of attraction near either equilibrium.
Imitation moves them toward a state in which everyone plays (U) or (-U) as a best
response amongst each other, and once they are in the vicinity of either of these
equilibria, they will tend to stay there. The legislator’s best response in this scenario
is nearly the same as when everyone plays (U) or (-U) in dominant strategies.14
There are two additional elements in her decision however: (1) how likely is
movement away from the stationary state and (2) how long will movement take.
As a Markov process, the likelihood from moving from any given state to another
is strictly positive. This is verified by noting that in any state, there is a positive
probability after learning has occurred that all players are drawn to be mutants and
choose the strategy that gives the new state in question. How long it takes for the
population to move from one equilibrium to the other, or from any point c(0) to any
equilibrium, depends on how quickly learning proceeds and how soon it leads to
consistent behavior. This in turn, depends on three aspects of the new law.
First, to what extent does the law reinforce what has governed intra- and
interagent relations in the past? A large deviation from existing levels of internal
cost and benefit bases for noncompliant and compliant behavior may be more
difficult to learn. Similarly, it may be more difficult to adjust to a large deviation
from existing levels of willingness to sanction or reward others for noncompliance
14 It is precisely the same as k goes to 0.
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and compliance. Gradual adjustments to the law, and hence to what is required of
agent relations for compliance, may increase the pace of learning. Second, learning
will be faster the more intelligible and simpler is the new law. When agents are
vaguely aware of a substantive legal change, or cannot process it easily due to its
complexity, the length of time required to update to optimal agent relations may be
very long. To this end, direct and simple communication from lawmakers can
eliminate the need for agents to learn new sanction and reward levels from each
other, which can take additional iterations of the game to process. Simpler behaviors
may be learned more quickly for similar reasons. Generally, learning will proceed
faster when less accumulation of experience at playing the game is required to
arrive at an optimal level of agent relations. Lastly, the more important the law is to
the players the more likely they will commit their decision-making resources toward
socially interacting around its substance. Consideration of what level of internal
costs and benefits that one assigns to a behavior, or learning what level of costs and
benefits other agents assign to a behavior is more likely to occur for behaviors that
the agent considers consequential.
5 Conclusion
We have considered how the post-expiration effect of temporary legislation impacts
the legislature’s choice of temporary or permanent timing rule. Although permanent
statutes can be repealed and temporary statutes can be extended, each allocates
legislation costs differently. This difference permits legislators to optimize on the
choice of timing rule when legislation produces residual effects, which we have
generally described as updates in agent relations. Updates increase compliance,
which in turn, reveal more information about the optimal location of the legislation
for both agents and legislators.
When agents do not undergo updating, the costs of complying with temporary
and permanent legislation are the same and the optimal location of legislation
remains the same. However, the fixed costs of legislating temporarily are weakly
greater than the fixed costs of legislating permanently since temporary legislation
may require numerous extensions. In this case, legislators weigh the difference in
permanent and temporary enactment costs against fixed temporary extension costs,
and maximize social welfare by choosing the timing rule that minimizes costs.
When agents undergo updating, compliance is less costly for both legislation
types and the optimal location of legislation changes. Marginal maintenance costs
are decreased, but only temporary timing rules can benefit from the reduction in
cost. In this case, legislators maximize social welfare by weighing any savings in
temporary marginal maintenance costs plus any savings in temporary enactment
costs against fixed temporary extension costs. More generally, this article
contributes to a growing body of literature on timing rules. While previous theories
have demonstrated the usage of timing rules in uncertain regulatory environments in
order to minimize transactions cost, our theory demonstrates their general usage to
minimize transactions cost, especially where legal impact is certain, but agent
adaptation is gradual.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Legislators are faced with the decision
 /0jxj  dðy0 þ q0 þ ðz0  r0Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ
? /1jxj  dðy1 þ q1þðz1  r1Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ
Recall that an agent chooses disobedience such that
di ¼
x  lci
1 þ pc þ bcs þ
bcsx
1 þ pc þ bcs 
1
2ð1 þ pc þ bcsÞbWa
and that aggregate disobedience is given by d ¼ R dif ðlÞdl for any distribution of
ideal policy positions. Because the profile (-U, -U) obtains in dominant strategies,
the location of normative relations c is j and pc and bcs remain unchanged by
definition. Moreover, as agent relations are not updated, ideal positions lc remain
unchanged. This implies that ðz0  r0Þd2 ¼ ðz1  r0Þd2. Because the fixed cost of a
repeal is the same for temporary and permanent legislation, q0 = q1, and because
permanent legislation cannot be extended, y1 = 0.
Legislators are therefore faced with
/0jxj  dðy0Þ?  /1jxj
and maximize social welfare by setting s = 1 when ð/1 þ /0Þjxj\  dy0, s = 0
when ð/1 þ /0Þjxj[  dy0, and s = 1 or 0 when ð/1 þ /0Þjxj ¼ dy0. h
Proof of Proposition 2
Because the profile (U, U) obtains in dominant strategies, the location of agent
relations c is #. Therefore, the penalty pc increases and the marginal cost of
compliance bcs decreases by assumption. Recall that an agent chooses disobedience
such that
di ¼
x  lci
1 þ pc þ bcs þ
bcsx
1 þ pc þ bcs 
1
2ð1 þ pc þ bcsÞbWa
Clearly, an increase in pc decreases disobedience. And since
o
obcs
bcs
1 þ pc þ bcs
 
[ 0
a decrease in bcs also decreases disobedience. By assumption, the location of c at #
shifts the ideal policy lci towards the new legislation x. This means that the distance
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jx  lcij decreases and as a result, disobedience di decreases. It follows that
aggregate disobedience, given by d ¼ R dif ðlÞdl, decreases for profile {U, U}.
Legislators are faced with the decision
 /0jxj  dðy0 þ q0 þ ðz0  r0Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ
? /1jxj  dðy1 þ q1 þ ðz1  r1Þd2Þ þ dVðx  dÞ
Aggregate disobedience d effects both z0 - r0 and z1 - r1, but recall that z1 = 0
because permanent legislation is not extended by definition. In contrast, z0 C 0.
Now decreasing d increases the absolute value of both marginal repeal costs r0
and r1. Therefore, -d(z0 - r0) B -d(z1 - r1).
Because the fixed cost of a repeal is the same for temporary and permanent
legislation, q0 = q1, and because permanent legislation cannot be extended, y1 = 0.
Legislators are therefore faced with
/0jxj  dy0  dz0 d2?  /1jxj
and maximize social welfare by setting s = 0 when dz0 d2 þ ð/1 þ /0Þjxj\dy0,
s = 1 when dz0 d2 þ ð/1 þ /0Þjxj[ dy0, s = 0 or 1 when dz0 d2 þ ð/1þ
/0Þjxj ¼ dy0. h
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